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This guide details the development of work and the promo-
tion of safety from the perspective of human and organiza-
tional factors. We will review what is meant by human and 
organizational factors, who should understand them and how 
they can be taken into account in practice. 
This	guide	is	intended	to	provide	rail	traff	ic	actors	with	
tips for developing their own work and for expanding and 
renewing their safety thinking. The guide may be useful for 
rail	traff	ic	operators,	units	in	charge	of	maintenance,	railway	
networks and other actors who develop safety culture. It can 
be utilized to train employees, supervisors, experts and man-
agement; to support work or as a resource for self-study. 
Rail	traff	ic	has	a	long	tradition	of	developing	safety	–	the	goal	
of the human and organizational factors perspective is to re-
frame and extend the work that has already been conducted.
The ProHF research project
This guide contains results, lessons learned and insights from 
the	“Human	factors	in	safety	–	eff	 iciency	and	operability”	
(ProHF) research and development project. The objective of 
this project was to assess how the mastery of human factor 
interventions carried out in 2000–2020 in the organizations 
that participated in the study impacted the organizations’ 
operations, such as their understanding of human factors be-
ing part of safety development and their safety management 
practices. The project data comprised interviews, obser-
vations during workplace visits, workshops, indicator data 
gathered	from	the	companies,	and	a	fi	nal	assessment.	
The project was driven and maintained by the participants’ 
passion to learn, understand and improve their own activities 
and safety.
It was implemented in co-operation between the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health (FIOH), the VR Group, ANS Finland Oyj, and Finavia Oyj. A FIOH study 
group led and co-ordinated the project. This guide is written by FIOH project group and published by the VR Group, which also provided comments on the idea 
and	content	of	the	guide.	The	Finnish	Transport	and	Communications	Agency	Trafi	com,	VTT	Technical	Research	Centre	of	Finland,	the	University	of	Tampere	
and	the	University	of	Vaasa	were	members	of	the	project’s	steering	group.	The	project	was	funded	by	the	Finnish	Work	Environment	Fund	and	FIOH,	to	which	
we would like to express our thanks. A warm thank you to all the project members! 
Information	about	the	project’s	other	outputs	and	results	is	available	at	www.ttl.fi	/prohf.					
TO THE READER
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SAFETY IS ABOUT HUMAN ACTIONS,  
which are successful most of the time. However, in everyday 
language,	the	term	“human	factors”	(HF)	often	has	a	negative	
connotation: when something bad happens, it is easy for us to 
turn to human factors, meaning mistakes made by an indi-
vidual. Examining human factors from a solely negative and 
individual perspective is risky: emphasizing human error may, 
for example, make people afraid to talk about or report defects 
or near-misses for fear of being blamed. 
Narrow, one-sided use of the term human factors does not fa-
cilitate development of work; it may actually increase tension 
in the work atmosphere and, at worst, cause safety-related 
factors to be hidden.  
In this guide, we use the term “human and organizational fac-
tors”	to	describe	the	creation	of	a	positive	safety	culture.	We	
base this on the latest safety thinking. Taking human factors 
into account in a positive and comprehensive manner turns 
thinking into shared actions, management, organization of 
work, and group-level activities.
• How can the organization help people succeed in their work? 
•	How	can	the	conditions	for	smoothly	flowing	and	safe	work		
	 be	created	for	different	occupational	groups?	
• In which areas are we already successful and why? 
• What, where and how do we learn? 
• What maintains and creates safety? 
• What impedes safety? 
The	term	human	factors	has	been	defined	in	various	ways	
and the understanding of the part that humans play in creat-
ing safety has changed over time. At its simplest, the idea is 
that we all create safety at our workplaces.  
The	above	definition	aims	to	broaden	the	concept	from	fo-
cusing on the individual and on errors towards more compre-
hensive and positive safety thinking.
It is crucial that human factors are taken into account as an 
everyday part of normal work, and not as a mere entry in the 
safety management manual. Human actions and characteris-
tics should be taken into account at the workplace or organiza-
tion when planning and managing work as well as in personnel 
development.	Ultimately,	this	should	be	evident	in	the	con-
versational culture that management and supervisors create, 
in the user-friendliness of instructions and procedures, and as 
healthy and happy operative personnel.
Human factor development programmes (Teperi, 2019) in 
safety-critical areas aim to:
• emphasize the focus on successes and the things that   
 work well
• enable deviations to be more openly raised
• create a more comprehensive understanding of the   
 background factors of deviations
• focus on constructively processing shortcomings and thus   
 encourage learning, participation and co-operation   
	 between	different	occupational	groups
• more openly share understanding and lessons learned. 
Using	the	concept	of	human	factors	in	a	positive	and	compre-
hensive way to improve the safety culture enables a broader 
view of the background factors of events. Development work 
becomes an instrument of open discussion.
 HUMAN FACTORS ARE THE FACTORS IN 
A GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL, ORGANIZATION-
AL OPERATIONS, OR WORK CHARACTER-
ISTICS, WHICH CAN EITHER SUPPORT OR 
WEAKEN THE SYSTEM’S ACTIVITIES AND 
THUS THE SAFETY OF SERVICES.” 
(TEPERI, 2012)
Rail traffic actors, including the VR Group, use the term 
“HOF” (human and organizational factor) for human 
factors. This is also the chosen practice of the European 
Union Agency for Railways. 
Human	Factors	is	a	scientific	discipline	with	a	history	that	
spans several decades. The concepts that explain the scope 
and methods in the area have evolved over time. The term 
“HF”	or	“Human	Factors”,	as	used	in	the	related	scientific	





WHAT ARE HUMAN 
FACTORS? 
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2.1 SAFETY THINKING IS EVOLVING – TOWARDS AN 
ADAPTIVE CAPABILITY 
A NEW DEFINITION of safety management and human factors 
is required in order to eliminate the deep-rooted notion of “hu-
mans	as	the	weakest	link	in	the	system”.	Safety	research	has	
highlighted a new approach that aims to make safety thinking 
even more understanding, positive and proactive. 
The	differences	between	the	traditional	approach	and	the	new	
approach are presented below (Hollnagel 2014) and in Figure 1 
on the next page. SAFETY I 
 – THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO   
 REALIZING AND DEVELOPING SAFETY
• SAFETY =  the risk of unwanted events is as low  
 as possible
• REACTIVE APPROACH: safety is improved by  
 eliminating risks, failures, errors and their 
 underlying reasons
• Focus on factors that impair safety, on “what  
	 goes	wrong”	
• People are perceived as sources of errors,  
 risk factors or risks 
 SAFETY II 
 – THE NEW APPROACH TO REALIZING  
    AND DEVELOPING SAFETY
• SAFETY =  as much as possible goes right and is   
 successful
• THE PROACTIVE APPROACH:	events	are	identified		
 and anticipated
• Focus on successes and factors that maintain safety
• Acceptance that human actions always vary and   
 the circumstances for actions are always restricted,  
 and that this requires adaptation 
• Resilience is created by developing work processes  
 and new work methods, reducing risks, mitigating  
 consequences, compensating for a lack of   
 resources and ensuring that work is done correctly
	•	People	are	perceived	as	assets	(“rescuers”)	who		 	
	 bring	flexibility,	elasticity	and	tolerance	to	systems		
 in constantly changing work situations 
2. 





RESILIENCE IS WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL OR 
ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONS SMOOTHLY 
AND FLEXIBLY IN A CHANGING OPERATING 
ENVIRONMENT, EVEN IN UNEXPECTED 
SITUATIONS. IT REQUIRES ANTICIPATING, 
LEARNING AND DEVELOPING TOGETHER.
THE EVOLVING VIEW of safety management and human 
factors is illustrated in Figure 1. below. 
It	is	important	to	note	that	“traditional”	safety	management	
measures may still be needed. As such, the Safety-I and Safe-
ty-II	viewpoints	presented	in	the	figure	actually	complement	
Figure 1. Change in safety thinking – an evolving concept of human factors and safety management 
(Teperi & Kannisto, 2018 based on Dekker, 2002; Hollnagel, 2014.)
IN A CHANGING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, ou must 
be able to ensure not only safety but also that operations are 
high	in	quality,	flow	smoothly	and	are	precise.	This	requires	
a	resilient	organization:	Today,	rail	traffic	operations	are	
challenged by international requirements such as regula-
tory reforms, increased national competition and changes 
demanded by global pandemics and other crises. 
The	human	and	organizational	factors	viewpoint	offers	tools	
for traditional safety work, such as risk assessment and 
deviation	analysis.	However,	it	also	offers	a	more	compre-





the perspective of the people who encountered it? How can 
we	succeed	as	often	as	possible	in	diverse	work	situations,	
which keep changing? How can we improve the general con-
ditions for success as well as eradicate individual risks?
Understanding	human	actions	becomes	increasingly	important	
as constant change and uncertainty challenge our adaptability. 
Resilience refers to the capacity of an individual or organi-
zation	to	flexibly	adapt	to	the	changing	requirements	of	the	
operating environment (Conklin, 2012; Hollnagel et al, 2006). 
Being able to prevent serious deviations is of central impor-
tance; to anticipate abnormal situations and manage them as 
they	occur;	to	mitigate	the	consequences	of	deviations	after	
the fact, and to learn from them in order to be able to deal 
with	future	deviations	(Annarelli	&	Nonino,	2016;	Uusitalo	&	
Ala-Laurinaho, 2017; Wahlström et al 2020). 
Resilience can be described as agile, rapidly recurring, 
flexible	actions	in	a	new	kind	of	situation	with	limited,	even	
scarce resources. A resilient work community will continually 
and preventatively learn and develop its operations.
Even malfunctions can be used as stepping stones when 
they are viewed as opportunities to analyse operations more 
closely and as tips on what to develop next.
ORGANISATION, SYSTEM, 
RESOURCES AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN FOCUS  
• Several contributing factors behind the cases
• Learning is main goal of investigation
• Human error is starting point for improvement  
  - not conclusion
  =NEW THINKING





• Latent systemic falures remains in system
  = OLD THINKING
FACTORS MAINTAINING SAFETY  








SUPPORT SYSTEM AND HUMAN RESILIENCE:








T IN SAFETY THINKING
each other. Risk analyses and deviation investigations, for 
example, must not be abandoned, because they are central 
methods for developing safety in many industries. But the 
way in which they are conducted may be improved and re-
framed. Safety practices that work should be continued.
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THE EVOLVING VIEWPOINT OF SAFETY RESEARCH 
(SAFETY-II) can only be put into practice through conscious 
thinking and actions; this challenges all personnel at the 
workplace, from management to safety experts and operative 
employees. 
The	previously	described	“maturity	phases”	of	safety	man-
agement are indeed complimentary. Traditional safety think-
ing, with its risk assessments, is still required but the models 
and	tools	offered	by	“human-centred”	thinking	should	be	
utilized alongside it and expand it.  




tools and measures.    
STUDYING HUMAN FACTORS – THE ProHF PROJECT 
IN VR FLEETCARE
This	guide	offers	examples,	views	and	experiences	of	the	
development path of human factors in VR FleetCare. The data 
is from the ProHF research project (2019–2020), in which VR 
FleetCare Oy (previously VR Maintenance) participated as one 
of the study’s target organizations. The data were collect-
ed through interviews and observations during workplace 
visits, by compiling indicator data and from two workshops. 
Approximately	15	people	from	different	levels	and	functions	
of the organization participated in the workshops.
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2.2 RELATED INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
RAIL TRAFFIC has already long paid attention to supporting 
and assessing human actions through, for example, occupa-
tional health services and human resources management. 
The newer viewpoint aims to describe and understand human 
actions as part of safety management. 
 THE HUMAN FACTOR IS PLAYING AN IN-
CREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN 
MODERN MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
SAFETY-CRITICAL RAILWAY SYSTEMS. 
ULTIMATELY, IT IS HUMAN ACTION THAT 
DETERMINES SUCCESS OR FAILURE.
 (RSSB, 2008)
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS are a current way of system-
atically improving and maintaining safety over the long term. 
Normal operations and deviations encountered in everyday 
work,	for	example,	offer	material	for	developing	operations,	




proper management of these matters is no longer a recom-
mendation but a prerequisite for continued operations. The 
Finnish	Transport	and	Communications	Agency	Traficom	
oversees that recommendations are met. 
The	European	Union	Agency	for	Railways	(ERA)	has	created	a	
safety management system wheel, a model of the elements 
that	a	rail	traffic	organization	must	implement	in	its	own	safety	
management. The central parts are planning, realization, 
assessment, and development of operations. When implement-
ing these, it is important to take into consideration the organ-
ization’s operating environment and human factors, including 
organizational factors (Appendix 1). The ERA also outlines the 




management systems and industry training was recommend-
ed already in 2015 as part of the Hyvinkää speeding inves-
tigation, conducted by the Safety Investigation Authority of 
Finland (SIA, 2015).
VR FLEETCARE – WHY HUMAN FACTORS? 
The reasons why the participants regarded taking human and 
organizational factors into consideration as being important 
were compiled in a workshop during the ProHF study (2019). 
The	figure	below	presents	the	most	salient	views.
The participants highlighted the importance of promoting 
a modern safety culture and safety thinking as well as risk 
management in the work environment. This development 
requires functional safety measures and tools. The partici-
pants saw incident and deviation investigations as central 
tools and felt that the HOF viewpoint expanded the technical 
perspective, helped identify root causes and reduced the 
culture of blame. In addition to processing deviations, human 
and organizational factors were recognized as an important 
preventative part of risk assessment. 
Another issue highlighted in addition to the factors related 
to safety culture was that human and organizational factors 
should be applied more broadly in the future development 
of operations, supervisory work and management. By the 
development	of	overall	operations,	the	participants	specifical-






















Figure 2. Why human factors? – Views of workshop participants
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THE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED change in safety thinking 
requires	a	defined	path,	process	or	programme	for	promoting	
the issue. The organization can then utilize this to promote 
a new kind of safety thinking and ensure that human and 
organizational factors are taken into consideration as part of 
safety and other management.
First, what is about to be developed should be considered as 
a whole. What is the organization actually developing under 
the heading of HOF?
 
• How is HOF understood? How is management committed?
• What is the current situation? 
• What are the goals of HOF?  
• How is motivation for development generated?
• Whose responsibility is development?
•	What	does	development	mean	in	practice	at	the	different			 	
	 levels	and	in	the	different	functions	of	the	organization?	
• How is trust in doing things together built?
• What are the measures and opportunities for improving the  
 level of safety and safety culture? 
• What does HOF actually mean in my work?  
•	What	does	HOF	affect	and	what	will	developing	it	change?
 
3.1 WHAT IS BEING DEVELOPED?  
 
Human	factors	comprise	a	wide	range	of	different	factors	
related to an individual’s actions, the characteristics of work, 
and the actions of groups and the organization. These all pro-
mote safe and smoothly running operations. So, what are we 
really developing by promoting the consideration of human 
factors in practice? 
Figure 3 outlines how the object of development expands 
slowly. First, a base is created: all employees must be pro-
vided with training in human factors and how taking it into 
consideration	can	affect	how	safe	operations	are	and	how	
smoothly	they	flow.	Developing	competence	and	awareness	
via training and discussion promotes a new kind of safety 
thinking. In joint events, it is important to create a common 
vision	of	what	human	factors	specifically	means	in	one’s	own	
company and operating environment and the terms that are 
used to discuss it. 
Already during training, participants should begin to apply 
what	they	have	learned.	Often,	it	is	most	natural	to	do	this	by	
examining and developing the company’s safety measures. 
For example, do current incident investigations take mat-
ters	related	to	human	factors	sufficiently	into	account?	How	
are matters related to human factors recorded in deviation 
reports? If human factors are included in safety measures, 
instructions and tools (such as incident reporting forms), 
they are systematically taken into account. Section 4 contains 
practical tips for this.
The	human	factor	perspective	offers	a	good	starting	point	and	
ideas	for	developing	work:	safe,	high-quality,	smoothly	flowing	
and productive work are all simultaneously promoted. For 
example, clear work instructions, clean and safe work, agreed 
standard work methods, and a common view of the oppor-
tunities	for	flexible	operations	ensure	that	basic	work	flows	
smoothly, and that even in unexpected situations, workers 
quickly	find	a	common	way	to	react.	The	initial	push	for	devel-
oping work could be the need to reduce the number of repet-
itive disturbances and interruptions, or possibly a new device 
that requires changing work methods.  The tips provided in 
Section 4 also function as guidelines for developing work. 
Improving resilience means comprehensively supporting 




erations becomes even more important. Examining human 
factors also helps people identify methods for supporting a 
common situation awareness and operational procedures, 
even in unpredictable and new situations. A central feature 
of a resilient organization is learning together. This happens 
not	only	during	training	but	also,	first	and	foremost,	during	
everyday work when confronting challenges together, shar-
ing ideas and lessons learned, and evaluating work practic-
es. This leads to the continual development of a common 













processing of deviations 
 
The human factor perspective was 
utilized	in	one	specific	accident	inves-
tigation and its use in a few other 
deviation and accident inves-
tigations gave encouraging 
results.
 
The many ways to 
develop competence
 
In 2016–2019, a HF programme for 
training instructors and experts within 
the organization was conducted in co-op-
eration with FIOH, by using FIOH’s framework 
and tools. Improved competence could be 
seen as an increased discussion on safety 
and human factors. The improvement 
of employees’ knowledge and 
awareness continues through 
induction refresher courses 
and online training.  
Improved consideration 
of human and organizational 
factors in safety measures
 
For example, utilizing the HF Tool to 
develop deviation description templates, 
investigation reports and safety management 
practices. The perceived reduction in blaming 
and better opportunities for employees 
to participate in deviation processing 
were considered important im-
provements.  
 
The application of 
the HOF perspective 
in updating work instruc-
tions and other develop-
ment of work and the 
work environment. 
 
The wish to integrate 
HOF more widely into 
anticipation, change man-
agement, the management of 







VR FLEETCARE’S DEVELOPMENT PATH
In 2016, the VR Group launched a project in co-operation with 
FIOH (the HF programme 2016–2019.) The programme includ-
ed the training of VR’s own instructors and experts, training 
in the renewed HF investigation model, and tailoring the HF 
Tool™	for	VR	Group’s	different	business	areas/divisions.	The	VR	
Group’s safety unit led the project. VR chose raising awareness 
(training, informing) and improving investigations as the main 
goals, and safety as the main perspective.
The following covers in more detail how increasing consider-
ation of human factors has progressed in VR FleetCare. The 
description is based on discussions during the ProHF project 








Figure 4. VR FleetCare’s development path
 TAKING HUMAN FACTORS INTO 
ACCOUNT HAS BEEN A JOURNEY OF 
SHARING INFORMATION, LEARNING 





3.2 IMPROVING AND IMPLEMENTING HUMAN FACTOR 
MASTERY THROUGH CO-OPERATION
Mastering human factors (including organizational factors) 
requires conscious actions and activeness from all levels and 
parties of an organization. 
 
The management must record this issue in the guiding prin-
ciples of the organization, such as the strategy, safety policy, 
safety management system, and occupational safety and 
health action plan. 
However, merely recording it is not enough. The perspective 
must be one of the decision-making criteria, such as when de-
ciding on investing in new equipment, implementing changes 
in the organization, planning the reorganization of work, or 
implementing changes in systems. The top executives are also 
responsible for ensuring a long-term, systematic plan for im-
plementing and developing this issue, as well as the resources 
required.
Supervisors need their own role to implement clear proce-
dures and tools for promoting the mastery of human and 
organizational factors in their own work community. For 
example, they must take HOF into account in deviation inves-
tigations and take previous successes into consideration in 
addition to identifying what went wrong. They must know how 
to process matters in an open and systematic way, without 
blaming, and by building trust between employees. By their 
own example and approach to work, supervisors promote the 
success of their operative employees. Their work needs to be 
supported by the top management, especially under excep-
tional circumstances. 
The supervisor’s role in the line organization must be clear. 
The operative personnel are primarily responsible for man-
aging their own competence and functional capacity to en-
sure that they can cope with their work and constantly adapt 
their situation awareness during everyday tasks. They must 
have an independent approach to work and be interested in 
personal professional development, while openly highlight-
ing any shortcomings they encounter in their work. Opera-
tive employees must be able to trust that their perspectives 
of practical work are taken into account when planning and 
managing work. 
It is essential that personnel are involved in the 
development of work. The company should 
create operational models and 
structures that enable discussions 
on work and its areas 
that need development. 
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THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
FACTORS must be considered in overall production, produc-
tion management, procedures, and the information systems 
that support them. In other words, these perspectives should 
already be considered proactively, and not only during and 
after	deviations.	This	means	that	those	who	plan	work,	the	




• Can the work environment be designed so that any distur  
 bances, such as noise, heat and cold can be controlled? 
• Has work been organized so that it is evenly distributed   
	 between	different	employees	and	parties?	 
• Are work-related roles and responsibilities clear? Do people  
 understand how their own actions impact the work 
 environment? 
 
• Is work managed in a way that enables participation? 
 Can employees participate in planning changes related to   
 their work? 
• Are perceived shortcomings processed openly?   
 What forums exist for these discussions?  
•	How	well	are	ideas	development	related	to	deficiencies	in		 	
 safety or quality or arising from third party investigations put  
 into practice? Are they used as a starting point for improving  
 operations? Does the organization learn from or repeat its   
 previous mistakes? 
A good rule of thumb for assessing whether the human factors 
perspective has been adopted is to ask:
Are the basic aspects of work in order, such as the tools and 
the work environment? Or will they improve if the process of 
mastering the human factors at the workplace progresses? 
How well this thinking has been accepted cannot be assessed 
on	the	basis	of	a	“new	jargon”.	Rather,	what	must	be	assessed	
is	how	well	the	basic	idea,	its	“philosophy”,	has	permeated	
into everyday activities. 
A	good	way	to	progress	is	to	first	see	how	the	organization	
works and how, for example, the management supports oper-
ative work. This can be followed by assessing how functional 
the working conditions (such as working hours, equipment, 
instructions)	are.	Only	after	this	should	an	organization	check	
whether work groups, teams and individuals have adopted 
the desired practices. 


























However, the HF Tool is not only used in investigations, even 
though this is a good way to learn to use the tool. It is also 
valuable in risk assessment, everyday operations and for 
developing work. It can, for example, help supervisors, those 
who plan work and all personnel identify which factors ena-
ble success at work and ensure safety, e.g. organizing work 
and recognizing human factors related to working hours may 
be in focus.
Since 2008, the HF Tool has been systematically utilized for 
reporting	incidents	in	Finnish	air	traff	ic	management.	Air	
traff	ic	controllers	have	used	the	tool	to	improve	their	un-
derstanding of how their own actions create safety and how 
diff	erent	background	factors	cause	or	mitigate	deviations	
(Teperi et al. 2015). Safety experts in the nuclear energy in-
dustry use the HF Tool to more deeply and comprehensively 
understand the human factors behind operational events as 
well as to better acknowledge successes (Teperi et al. 2017.) 
In aviation maintenance, the HF Tool has helped develop the 
comprehensive recognition of safety critical work phases in 
co-operation	between	diff	erent	levels	of	the	organization	and	
together with co-operative partners. The tool was used for 
forming dozens of ideas regarding, for example, the areas of 
work processes that needed development, and improving 
the recruitment processes and co-operation practices of the 
company and the occupational health service centre. The 
workplace investigation process was also improved and now 
takes the safety critical nature of aviation maintenance better 
into account (Teperi et al. 2019.) 
4.1 GETTING TO KNOW THE HF Tool™ 
The	HF	Tool™	was	originally	created	for	air	traff	ic	manage-
ment in 2003 to promote competence in and the analysis of 
human factors. The objectives of the tool were:
• To provide a comprehensive outline of human factors as   
 actions among individuals, work characteristics and group   
 and organizational factors, as well as among    
 organizations themselves
• To verbalize human actions in a diverse way
• To highlight the functional and positive aspects of human   
 actions and human variability
• To improve employees’ skills in this area (Teperi, 2012)
The purpose of the tool is to illustrate how systemic and 
comprehensive	human	actions	are	and	how	diff	erent	factors	
interact. The success of activities is decided by many factors; 
factors	that	also	infl	uence	each	other	–	no	individual	factor	




An analysis tool based on the HF Tool was tailored to enable 
the VR Group to analyse human factors and create awareness. 
Thus far, the VR Group has used the HF Tool for creating aware-
ness, developing competence, training and research. (Figure 5.)
1.  Competence, mastery of work
2.  Situation awareness (perception,  
	 memory,	decision-making,	response/	
 execution)
3.  Working along instruction   
 and agreed procedures
4.		 Understanding	the	bigger	picture/	
 overall situation
5.  Proacting, preconceptions and 
 assuring assumptions
6.		 Workload	(overload/unload)		
 and means for managing it
7.  Vigilance, alertness, 
 fatigue symptoms
8.  Life situation, anxiety, 
 level of (long-term) stress
9.  Age; quality and quantity of 
 work experience
10. Health, work ability
11.  Motivation, attitudes
12.  Emotional state and reactions, mood
13.  Information systems
14.  Physiological factors, experience
40. management and leadership;   
 structure, styles
41. organization culture
42. co-operation and trust between   
	 diff	erent	organization	levels	and	units
43. understanding railway safety as a   
 whole throughout the railway 
 company’s management
44. decisions made (incl. resources,  
 personnel, equipment)
45. change management (personnel,   
 systems)
46. co-operation with partners
47. The company’s support for rail   
 operations
20. Quality and contents of work;  
 work demands
21.  Quantity of work; time pressure,  
 having to rush
22.  Work organization, work distribu- 
 tion, job descriptions; clarity
23.		Usability	and	functionality	of		
	 devices,	soft	ware,	technology
24.  Procedures and instructions;  
 functionality, clarity and 
 being up-to-date
25.		Opportunities	to	infl	uence	one’s		
 work and working conditions 
26.  Feedback on work, professional  
 appreciation
27.		Opportunity/ability	to	evaluate		
 and develop one’s work processes
28.  Assuring competence (training,  
 exercises, other ways of learning)
29.   Work hygiene factors, physical  
 work environment, working   
 conditions, occupational hygiene  
 factors (noise, ventilation,   
 lighting, temperature; layout)
30. Shared understanding of the   
 situation among all group members
31. Knowledge of all group members 
 is used
32. Communication within group (e.g. are   
 misunderstandings, misinterpretations  
 and mishearing corrected)
33. Structure and cohesion of group,   
 group dynamics (social relations,   





36. Decision-making in group
37. Safety culture
38. Manager supports the concretisation   
 of safety at work
Figure 5. VR Group’s “Human Factors” analysis tool 
(based on HF Tool™ by the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health)
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THE ACTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDU-
AL are an important area to note because human factors 
are always connected to human actions in some way. 
The essential issue is the perspective from which an 
individual’s actions are considered. The actions and 
characteristics of an individual must not be seen 
as a list of reasons for an unfavourable event but 
rather a description of matters that a well-func-
tioning work community and organization can 
take into account. (Figure 6.) 
The section on the individual examines the 




when determining that factors that impact these 
actions. Only one of the four sections of the HF 
Tool describes the actions of the individual. Good 
human factor mastery also involves comprehensively 
considering factors not related to the individual. It also 
makes discussing more sensitive issues such as personal 
problems or emotional reactions easier when the tool lists 
all the issues.  
 
Actions on the individual level can be best supported when 
their	connection	to	work	and	to	the	different	levels	of	the	
organization are understood. Situation awareness and 
motivation, for example, do not improve if employees are 
merely	told	to	“be	more	precise”	or	“mend	their	ways”.	A	more	
essential question is: How can work and the work community 
be improved so that the employee’s situation awareness and 
motivation improve?  
 
Some factors that impact individual actions and character-
istics are more closely connected to work (such as workload 
and instructions), whereas others (health and life situation) 
are more strongly connected to the employee as an individu-
al.	To	master	human	factors,	it	is	important	to	first	consider,	in	
both	cases,	which	work	and	workplace	factors	we	can	affect.	
It is also easier to address any possible issues related to an 
employee’s personal life when everything is in order at the 
workplace.
Figure 6. VR Group’s HF Tool™: Actions and characteristics of the individual 
WORK OPERATIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS are closely 
connected to human factors. Work demands can be 
conceptualized as a counterpart of human factors. 
Workload and the impact of individual factors can 
be managed by altering the characteristics of 
work and paying attention to physical and psy-
chological	ergonomics.	The	different	character-
istics and demands of work create psychoso-
cial stress in addition to physical stress. These 
can be related to either the content of work, 
the organization of work, or the social inter-
action of the work community. Excessive or 
unmanaged psychosocial stress increases the 
risk of human error (Figure 7.).
The sections of the HF Tool that focus most on 
psychosocial stress are Work characteristics and 
Group-level factors. The Work characteristics 
section focuses on working conditions in addition 
to the content and organization of work. Working 
conditions	are	often	neglected	when	examining	
human factors, even though, together with appropri-
ately assigned tasks, they provide the basis for smoothly 
flowing	and	safe	work.		
Processing	the	Work	characteristics	section	clarifies	the	prac-
tical work situations and local circumstances in which work is 
carried out. Changes in the characteristics of work and related 
arrangements	affect	how	employees	cope	in	their	work	and	
enjoy it.
Figure 7. VR Group’s HF Tool™: Work operations and characteristics




needing development included the management of 
alertness and fatigue and support in motivation and 
attitude-related matters.
In the ProHF project, the employees of VR FleetCare regard-
ed	training	at	work	and	opportunities	to	influence	their	own	
work as positive factors on the work level. The functionality 
of devices and systems, workload and time pressure, as well 
as matters related to the work environment were considered 
challenging. Perceptions of work methods and instructions 
were divided. Some considered work instructions and 
procedures to be strengths of the work. However, others felt 
these matters clearly required further development.
ACTIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE INDIVIDUAL
1.  Competence, mastery of work
2.  Situation awareness (perception, memory, 
	 decision-making,	response/execution)
3.  Working along instruction and agreed procedures
4.		 Understanding	the	bigger	picture/	overall	situation
5.  Proacting, preconceptions and 
 assuring assumptions
6.		 Workload	(overload/unload)	and	means	for	managing	it
7.  Vigilance, alertness, fatigue symptoms
8.  Life situation, anxiety, 
 level of (long-term) stress
9.  Age; quality and quantity of work experience
10. Health, work ability
11.  Motivation, attitudes
12.  Emotional state and reactions, mood
13.  Information systems
14.  Physiological factors, experience
WORK OPERATIONS AND CHARACTERISTIC 
20. Quality and contents of work; work demands
21.  Quantity of work; time pressure, having to rush




24.  Procedures and instructions; functionality, clarity 
 and being up-to-date
25.		Opportunities	to	influence	one’s	work	and	working		
 conditions 
26.  Feedback on work, professional appreciation
27.		Opportunity/ability	to	evaluate	and	develop	one’s		
 work processes
28.  Assuring competence (training, exercises, 
 other ways of learning)
29.   Work hygiene factors, physical work environment,  
 working conditions, occupational hygiene factors 
 (noise, ventilation, lighting, temperature; layout)
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In the ProHF project interviews, group cohesion and 
supervisor	support	were	identified	as	the	most	ob-
vious group-level resources. Safety culture was also 
highlighted	as	positive.	Difficulties	in	communication	
and misunderstandings related to work were listed as 
challenges that require further development.
In the ProHF project interviews, the employees high-
lighted organizational factors less frequently than 
other levels related to the mastery of human factors. 
Change management and organizational culture were 
described as obvious strengths. On the other hand, 
areas	that	needed	development	were	identified	in	both,	
in particular those related to the organization’s deci-
sion-making.
ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL FACTORS contain the struc-
tures that form the basis of a company’s operations. 
However,	specific	work	situations	are	seldom	
examined in relation to organizational level factors. 
Examining organizational factors produces a 
common	understanding	between	different	levels	
of the organization of the connections between 
the wider organizational context and opera-
tional work situations. 
Taking the items of the HF Tool into account in 
everyday work situations makes management 
visible to the operative personnel and con-
firms	the	impact	of	management	among	those	
in management positions (Figure 9.)
The items also encourage assessment of the 
organizational culture: customary practices, 
approaches, values, and priorities. The organiza-
tion’s own understanding of culture is very impor-
tant	because	in	order	to	change	culture	one	must	first	
understand what is being changed.  
Organizational factors express not only the organization’s 
internal factors but also those related to inter-organization 
operations, such as co-operation with the authorities.
Figure 9. VR Group’s HF Tool™: Organization-level factors
GROUP-LEVEL FACTORS describe matters that make 
the group’s co-operation successful. As work is always 
conducted as part of a group, group-level factors im-
pact every situation in one way or another. As such, 
the impact of group-level factors should also be 
considered from the perspective of groups other 
than	official	and	established	teams.	Groups	
may be short term, such as project teams that 
work closely together even though the group 
is	disbanded	after	the	project	is	completed.	
In addition, organizational or unit boundaries 
may exist even within tight-knit groups. The 
HF Tool’s group-level perspective can also be 
used for assessing pair work, in relation to is-
sues such as communication, decision-making 
and situation awareness. (Figure 8.)
Based on their everyday experiences, many may 
feel reluctant to discuss their group’s internal mat-
ters outside the group. Examining a group’s actions 
is not neutral in the way reviewing technical details 
is,	which	is	why	it	is	often	not	done	at	all.	Discussing	the	
group’s internal atmosphere can be very sensitive and it 
can be challenging to adopt a groupwork perspective when 
examining routine activities. Group-level phenomena are not 
necessarily	considered	part	of	the	safety	“vocabulary”.
Thus, the perspective of group action is not necessarily taken 
into account in incident investigations or other safety-related 
work. This is why this perspective should be promoted. As 
part of normal work, assessment of group actions provides 
many opportunities to develop the team’s operations. You 
could, for example, agree on communication practices and 
methods to create a common understanding of the situation. 
In order to develop work, it is also important to remain as 
neutral as possible when raising factors related to the interac-
tion between members of the group. Processing group-level 
factors encourages teams to consider together how to im-
prove members’ interactions.
Figure 8. VR Group’s HF Tool™: Group-level factors
GROUP-LEVEL FACTORS
30. Shared understanding of the situation   
 among all group members
31. Knowledge of all group members is used
32. Communication within group (e.g. are   
 misunderstandings, misinterpretations  
 and mishearing corrected)
33. Structure and cohesion of group, group  




36. Decision-making in group
37. Safety culture
38. Manager supports the concretisation of  
 safety at work
ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL FACTORS
40. management and leadership; structure, styles
41. organization culture
42.	 co-operation	and	trust	between	different		
 organization levels and units
43. understanding railway safety as a whole  
 throughout the railway company’s 
 management
44. decisions made (incl. resources,personnel,  
 equipment)
45. change management (personnel, systems)
46. co-operation with partners
47. The company’s support for rail operations
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4.2 LEARNING FROM DEVIATIONS
THE VR GROUP WANTED to analyse the background factors 
related to deviations more deeply and precisely as well as to 
ensure that the human factor perspective is part of analysing 
deviations.  
An HF analysis tool, tailored for the VR Group (Figure 5), was 
introduced in 2016.  Below, the VR Group’s investigations are 
explained in more detail: why the analysis tool was adopted, 
who uses it and how it is used.
 
WHY INVOLVE HUMAN FACTORS IN INVESTIGATIONS? DOES 
IT MEAN THAT PEOPLE ARE ASSESSED MORE CLOSELY?
Involving the human factor perspective in investigations does 
not signify a more detailed assessment or control of human 
actions or characteristics. Nor does involving the human factor 
perspective in investigations mean technically listing or using 
the points of the HF analysis tool. The basic goal of using the 
tool is to enable openly raising issues, to gain a comprehen-
sive understanding of background factors, to direct attention 
to what works well, to enable processing drawbacks in order 
to learn, and to enable sharing of the lessons and insights 
learned.  The ultimate goal is an improved understanding of 
one’s own actions in a safety critical work environment. Anoth-
er purpose is to understand the impact that the background 
factors of the work environment and the organization have on 
successful work. The idea is to create a work atmosphere that 
allows	constructive	self-reflection	in	a	constructive,	positive	
and safe atmosphere.  
WHO CONDUCTS THE INVESTIGATION AND HOW IS IT 
CONDUCTED?  
In the VR Group, investigations are led by the local supervisor. 
After	a	deviation	occurs,	a	local	team	is	assembled	to	conduct	
the deviation investigation. In rolling stock maintenance in VR 
FleetCare, the rolling stock engineers or supervisors provide 
their	expertise.	In	VR’s	Train	operations	and	commuter	traffic,	
similar expertise in operative work is provided by the traction 
services specialists who have work experience and knowledge 
of	operative	specifics.	
The HF analysis tool and its related timeline model are em-
ployed as investigative tools. The VR Group’s HF trainers and 
experts have been trained in their use (Figure 5, HF analysis 
tool and Figure 10, timelines).  The tools are based on models 
originally developed by  the investigation team of Finavia’s 
safety unit in the 2000s. Prior to railways, they were applied 
in projects related to municipal organizations and seafaring 
(Teperi, 2014; Teperi & Puro, 2016).
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1. Initiation of the investigation, gathering of background 




3. Drawing up the chain of events on a neutral, grey timeline   
 in the middle of the chart (Figure 10.). What happened,   
 step by step? 
4.	 Identifi	cation	and	recording	of	the	“failures	and	successes”		
	 during	the	diff	erent	phases	of	the	incident	on	the	timelines		
 above and below the incident description 
 • In the green area, things that went well, functions that   
	 	 were	handled	well	and	successes	in	diff	erent	phases		 	
  of the chain of events in question 
 •  In the red area, the phases and issues that could have   
  been handled better, that is, operational weaknesses   
  and failures in handling the situation 
5.	 Use	of	the	HF	analysis	tool	to	number	the	human	factors	
that impacted the incident: which factors at the individual, 
work, group and organizational levels enabled the incident 
to progress and, on the other hand, which factors enabled 
observing the situation and alleviating the consequences.  
	 •	 Issues	in	either	the	green	or	red	areas	in	the	diff	erent	
parts of the tool identify background factors that either rein-
forced or weakened safety during the incident. The actor is 
recorded	in	parentheses	aft	er	the	issue.
Below is an example of an incident that happened in 2010 in 
which passenger cars ran into a station building. The analysis 
uses a thorough report on the issue by the Safety Investiga-
tion Authority (SIA, 2010). The case was also used as part of 
the VR Group’s HF training (Figure 10.).
Figure 10. Timeline model used in the investigations 
(original investigation model created in Finavia’s Safety and quality unit, described also in Teperi, 2014; Teperi & Puro, 2016).
One issue that was observed using the investigation model 
is that previous investigations had only emphasized techni-
cal matters. The human perspective had mainly focused on 
identifying errors and considering whether sanctions would 
or would not be imposed as a consequence of the incident. 
One supervisor who participated in the ProHF study described 
the insights into the area of human factors that they gained as 
follows: 
 “I learned why there have been deviations. If we had   
 understood human factors before, we could have found   
 more appropriate solutions and corrective measures.”
HOW ARE INVESTIGATIONS PROCESSED FURTHER AND 
HOW CAN WE LEARN FROM THEM? 
The further processing of a completed investigation in the 
organization depends on the type and severity of the devia-
tion.  For example, in Fleetcare, the safety manager presents 
the	most	signifi	cant	completed	investigations	to	FleetCare’s	
executive team, which considers whether or not corrective 
measures are required.  The supervisors provide information 
in Teams meetings to their colleagues on completed investi-
gations, which allows other parts of the organization to learn 
from the deviations.  The executive team always reviews 
investigation summaries.
Lessons learned from the procedure are shared further, both 
nationally and internationally. Sharing the lessons learned 
from investigations and the using HF tools outside the organ-
ization is a sign of good safety thinking. Completed investi-
gations have been presented; for example, in the national 
Rata2018	seminar	(Rautatietekniikka	1/2018,	99-103),	in	the	
HOF	network	led	by	Trafi	com,	and	internationally	in	events	
organized by ERA. FleetCare’s development work is also the 
topic of a dissertation (Ohvo, 2017) in the Safety and security 
management	programme	of	Aalto	University.	
PHASES OF INVESTIGATIONS:
Collision of passenger cars with a rail barrier and then the wall of an offi  ce building at the 
Helsinki central railway station, fi nland, 4th january, 2010 
Note the things that went well – these will be reinforced
The driver of the on-
coming train reported 
seeing	a	fl	ash	in	the	








snow and ice 
had begun to 
accumulate 
on the trains 
and rolling 














F inspected the 
cars to ensure 
they were ready 
for use and test-







cars were in 
place.
G coupled the 
locomotive to the 
train, did a simple 
brake test and 
visually assessed 
that the cars 
were coupled -> 
reported to A that 





































B gets a 
crowbar 
and uses it 
to close the 
angle cocks 
and goes to 
release the 
brakes at 








why the train 
stopped for 





At 08:24, the 
train	sets	off	 	
when B has 
released the 
brakes of 
the last car. 





that the train 
has four 










the cars had 
broken away 
and decided 









heard about the 
incident and 
sent out alerts 
and a trainee 
warned security 




At 08:28 the cars 
collided at 35 
km/h	into	the	rail	
barrier and then 
into the wall of 
a building. The 
accident resulted 
in no serious 
injuries, but ex-
tensive structure 
and roller stock 
damage.
Note the failures and things that went badly – these we learn from
Large snow and ice formation part-
ly prevented requisite inspection.
(24= changing conditions had not been taken into account in the guidelines
43=	the	overall	eff	ect	of	freezing	was	not	understood	in	the	organization)
Conductor B did not realize that the reason for the 
train stopping was that it had broken into two – but 
thought that it was due to an electrical fault.
(2= failure of individual’s situation awareness
30= the parties did not have a common understanding of the situation.)
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4.3 PROACTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT OF 
RISKS
HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS and matters that 
affect	them	have	traditionally	been	viewed	from	the	perspec-
tive of deviations and the related investigation. This is im-
portant in order to minimize similar risk situations. However, 
safety	research	has	often	found	that	such	a	reactive	approach	
alone	is	not	sufficient.
 In constantly changing dynamic and complex situations, the 
mastery of safety and human factors requires looking ahead 
in	a	flexible	manner.	This	is	a	proactive	approach.	A	proactive	
organization will identify risks before any damage occurs. On 
the practical level, this could mean acknowledging human 
and organizational factors in leadership and management, in 
safety management systems, and in the overall development 
of work and everyday work routines. 
Safety-critical	industries	have	recognized	that	the	significance	
of the characteristics of work and the related processes is 
intrinsically connected to HOF management. The aviation 
industry, for example, aims to standardize all of its work pro-
cesses	as	exactly	as	possible	in	order	to	minimize	differences	in	
“ways	of	working”.	Communication	takes	place	in	compliance	
with exact guidelines and standardized phrases. The stand-
ardization of work and related processes can be considered a 
continuum that should be applied more rigidly as the likeli-
hood of a risk event increases. Actions related to safety-critical 
work or work phases should be very strictly standardized. 
Correspondingly, a wider margin may be allowed in a less 
critical phase or one that is more clearly externally observed. 
Naturally, there are very few tasks in which all work processes 
could be standardized.
From a proactive safety management perspective, it is im-
portant to not only identify where risks may occur but also 
to be able to adopt the human factors perspective. In safety 
critical industries, when changes are made to the work or in 
the organization, this type of HOF approach should be part of 
normal operations. 
Normal limits of human information processing related to 
matters such as working memory and attention should be tak-
en into consideration because interruptions and disturbances 
in the work environment can easily have an impact on them. 
When changes are made to work, the demands for informa-
tion processing (cognition) may also change. Normal limits of 
memory and attention can be managed by employing practic-
es such as working in pairs and utilizing checklists.  
Proactive	risk	identification	can	begin	by	simply	observing	the	
work process, and with the employee and supervisor discuss-
ing the content and phases of work and the factors that have 
an	effect	on	them.	Usually,	it	is	the	employee	who	can	best	
identify the places that have risks and the factors required 
for	work	to	flow	smoothly.	When	considering	the	impact	of	
human and organizational factors, it is important to keep the 
conversation emotionally neutral and avoid blaming. Listen-
ing to employees in an open and appreciative way usually 
ensures success in the development of work. It is also impor-
tant to create structures in the work community that allow 
employees to express ideas for developing work as easily as 
possible. 
Although the HF Tool™ was not primarily developed for the 
purposes of developing work, maintenance employees found 
many parts of their work that, from a human factor perspec-
tive, should be improved. Optimally, the tool is not limited to 
only facilitating the development of work from a HOF per-
spective; it also acts as a way of examining the condition of 
work-related human factors when changes are made to work 
or working conditions, such as in the case of organizational 
changes. 
The HF Tool™ can be used in risk and safety assessments prior 
to any large changes to equipment, systems or the organi-
zation. In some industries, the HF Tool™ has been integrated 
into digital risk assessment systems, which enables assess-
ment of the impact of a change on the actions of individuals 
and	teams,	as	well	as	on	different	characteristics	of	work,	as	
part of proactive safety management. If a digital risk assess-
ment process has not yet been deployed, the HF Tool™ can 
still be utilized separately for assessing the impact of changes, 
organizing ideas and identifying issues.
Individual work phases can also be examined by utilizing 
parts of the HF Tool™ to identify which things are already in 
order and which require further development.
VR’s	first	steps	on	the	HF	path	were	to	increase	aware-
ness and develop incident (deviation) investigations. 
However, during the ProHF project, many comments 
were made on how getting acquainted with the topic 
broadened people’s thinking and provoked thoughts 
about new applications for HOF: “this could be ap-
plied	in...”	The	most	salient	points	were	related	to	the	
proactive application of the HOF perspective and the 
development of work.
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THIS GUIDE DESCRIBES what is meant by human factors 
(including organizational factors), why their development is 
important, and how their mastery can be promoted in prac-
tice. The practical tools and examples from the ProHF research 
project show that fostering safety thinking requires a great 
deal	of	development	work	from	different	parts	of	an	organiza-
tion: strategic management, supervisory work and practical 
everyday work. 
As such, improving the mastery of human factors is not a single 
development project; it requires a long-term commitment to 
continuous learning and joint development on the part of the 
organization. How do we know we are progressing on the de-
velopment path? How do we know where we have succeeded 
and what requires further development?
To answer the above questions we must learn together 
through continuously following up and evaluating develop-
ment. In practice, this means events and opportunities for 
people to discuss human factors, pose questions and provide 
new ideas. To evaluate successes and the areas that need 
development, we need the views and experiences of various 
parties. What has the development of human factors manage-
ment	concretely	meant	for	your	work?	What	has	it	affected	
and	what	has	not	been	affected?	Which	matters	do	you	think	
should be considered in the future?
A set of criteria for successful development in either a unit 
or the entire organization can be drawn up to help evalu-
ate development and shared learning.  The following list of 
elements central to human factors and their development, 
compiled from the literature, can be helpful (Teperi, 2020.)
1. POSITIVE, SOLUCTION-BASED VIEW OF HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE
According to modern safety thinking, the focus should not only 
be on mistakes and errors; it is also important to observe and 
communicate that, for the most part, work goes well because 
people are professionally competent, functionally able, and act 
in accordance with commonly agreed practices – they succeed 
in their work. Safety conversations should not focus too much 
on threats, risks or failures. Of course, when these do occur, they 
should be openly, directly and constructively processed. High-
lighting success is important in safety work.
2. SYSTEMIC INTERACTION – FOCUSING ON INTERCONNECT-
ED RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE SYS-
TEMS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL ISSUES
Being connected to many actors and complex changes is typical 
in modern work. Changes and developments in one part of the 
work	system	affect	the	work	of	many	other	actors.	In	fact,	many	
issues	that	affect	human	factor	mastery	are	on	the	level	of	the	or-
ganization or its networks. Thus, these factors must be observed 
systemically.
3. CONCRETE PRACTICES, METHODS AND TOOLS FOR MAS-
TERING HF IN REAL WORK
Mastery of HF cannot remain a strategic goal. It requires practical 
everyday procedures and applicable methods. This in turn re-
quires	actions	and	competence	at	different	levels	of	the	organi-
zation – not only in operative work but also in expert work, work 
and production planning, supervisory work, and management.
4. UNDERSTANDING HOW HUMAN PERFORMANCE VARIES 
AND PROVIDING SUPPORT IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS  
Mastery of HF means creating preconditions and opportunities 
for people to succeed in their work. However, the variability of 
human	performance	is	a	central	part	of	human	nature.	Under-
standing this and taking it into consideration is important when 
planning work and designing the work environment. Sometimes, 
success and failure are very close to each other; a chance occur-
rence or good luck may prevent a situation from escalating.
5. MASTERY OF HF PLANNED AND LED BY A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY GROUP
Human factors mastery should be led in a co-ordinated way. 
Its planning and development require multidisciplinary under-
standing	of	the	factors	that	affect	work	from	the	perspective	of	
different	functions	and	professions.	For	this	reason,	the	develop-
ment group should have multidisciplinary competence: technical 
and psychological knowledge as well as competence in manag-
ing and developing the organization.   
6. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN ACTORS WHEN 
IMPLEMENTING SAFETY 
Whether or not HF has been mastered is tested and measured in 
everyday work. Safety targets provide a guideline, but the way 
in which to achieve them is constructed through co-operation 
between	various	parties.	Effective	co-operation,	safety	measures	
and communication are needed in order to achieve a common 
understanding of the overall situation. 
7. HF POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES BASED ON RESEARCH EVI-
DENCE
A	great	deal	of	research	evidence	exists	in	the	field	of	human	and	
organizational factors. The organization and its experts should 
be aware of current developments and well-functioning evi-
dence-based models backed by research that could be applied 
in	their	own	organization.	Significant	changes	should	not	be	
implemented on the basis of a hunch.
5. 




MASTERY OF HUMAN FACTORS – CRITERIA FOR SUCCESSFUL DEVELOPMENT (TEPERI, 2020)
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WHAT ARE SUCCESSFUL HOF ACTIVITIES?
The participants of the ProHF workshop (2020) compiled a list 
of criteria that describes successful HOF activities:  issues that 
may	be	affected	by	development	and	how	progress	on	the	
development path is visible in practice.
POSITIVITY
• a positive approach





•  improving safety culture,  
 culture of no blame
• communications, such as  
 management info sessions
• caring about your own safety  




• commitment through  
 communication –   
 competence related to  
 human and organizational  
	 factors	is	firmly	established		
 and understood  
• application and utilization  
 in everyday operations –  
 how understanding the  
	 HOF	perspective	affects	an		
 individual’s actions 
IMPACT ON WORK
• creating opportunities and  
 preconditions 
• making it concrete, e.g.  
 clarifying the impact of  
 changes to work
• maintaining and developing  
 training
METHODS, TOOLS
• creating operational methods  
 based on the tools
• learning from deviations  
 throughout the organization  
•	 finding	root	causes
COMPREHENSIVE HOF
• part of the management system,  
 description of the management  
 of human and organizational   
 factors
• taken into account in other   
 management areas in addition to  
 safety, utilized where applicable
• safety work and targets   
 described, transparent   
 safety activities
CONTINUITY
• continuous, systematic research  
 and development of operations
• network of experts
• human and organizational factors  
 integrated into workplace   
 activities
LEARNING
• communicating about   
 investigations, disseminating   
 information to the organization
• assessing investigations and   
 learning from them
• HOF network experts, i.e. those  
	 already	active	in	the	field,		 	
 learning from each other   
 and utilizing their knowledge   
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